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Summary findings
The transition from a centrally planned to a market  percent). Returns to higher education are slightly higher
economy is likely to have a strong impact on the labor  for women (12 percent) than for men (10 percent).
market, on relative earnings, and on returns to  Evidence from other transition economies suggests that
education.  returns are likely to increase as reforms in the labor
Major economic reforms in Vietnam since 1986 (the  market take full effect. The results support  this
policy known as Doi Moi) have included a number of  hypothesis: Returns for younger Vietnamese workers (14
measures to liberalize the labor market. It is too soon to  percent) are considerably higher than for older workers
asess the full impact of these reforms, but Moock,  (only 4 percent).
Patrinos, and Venkataraman analyze the returns to  Implications for policymaking:
education,  on the basis of earnings in 1992-93  (collected  *  It is important  to monitor future earnings and
in the first Vietnam Living Standards Survey).  trends in the labor market, as updates of this analysis
This represents one of the first countrywide analyses of  could provide more robust estimates of the transition's
the monetary benefits of schooling in Vietnam at a time  effects on earnings and returns to education.
when the labor market was in transition.  *  At a time when the Vietnamese government is
On average, the estimated rates of returns are still  reassessing its pricing policy, the fact that private rates of
relatively low, which is to be expected, since salary  return to higher education are relatively high suggests the
reforms were not introduced until 1993. Average private  potential for greater cost recovery.
rates of return to primary education (13 percent) and  *  Efforts to improve efficiency in secondary and
university education (11 percent) are higher than those  higher education could increase the rate of return by
to secondary and vocational education (only 4 to S  lowering costs.
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INTRODUCTION
The most recent study of the benefits of education in Vietnam appeared almost 30 years
ago (Stroup and Hargrove  1969), and this covered only a part of what was then South Vietnam.
Since that time Vietnam has gone through a process of reunification and rebuilding, and now a
realignment of the economy towards a more market-oriented approach.  Economic transition has
led to  certain problems in the labor market.  The education system that  may have served the
country well in a  command economy will need to  be adapted to  serve the needs of a market
economy.
There is a strong commitment to education in Vietnam.  This is reflected in high levels of
schooling participation and adult literacy that exceed neighboring countries and even some of the
more advanced Asian nations (World Bank  1995a;  Tan and Mingat 1992).  In the late  1980s,
however, enrollments in pre-primary, primary and especially secondary schooling declined (World
Bank  1997).  Opening up  the economy has provided many new income-earning opportunities,
* This paper was written  as background  for the World  Bank's Vietnam  Education  Financing  Sector  Study.
A preliminary  version of this paper was presented at the Microeconomics:  Theory and Applications
Workshop  at the University  of Illinois  at Chicago,  April 11, 1997,  where  useful comments  were received,
especially  from Carmela  Chiswick  and Barry Chiswick. Comments  also received  from Christopher  Shaw
and Maureen  Woodhall.thus  increasing the  opportunity  cost  of  schooling and  perhaps  reducing  rates  of  return  to
schooling.
Education is an important determinant of earnings in market economies.  The higher is
one's  level of education, the higher is that person's  starting salary and the  steeper the rise in
earnings during  the  early working  life.  The  evidence from  centrally planned  economies  is
relatively limited, including from economies in transition.  Nevertheless, it has been shown that in
centrally planned economies returns to  schooling are usually low,  for example, in China (see
Jamison and van der Gaag  1987), but they tend to  increase as market reforms take place, for
example, in Slovenia (Orazem and Vodopivec  1995) and Hungary (Varga  1995).  This paper
examines the returns to education in Vietnam in the early stages of transition (based on earnings
data fro 1992-93).  It is hoped to update these estimates at a later date, to examine the effects of
market liberalization and education reforms.
KEY LABOR MARKET  REFORMS
The Vietnamese government's strategy for development places high priority on investment
in human capital.  But there are problems.  There is a high population growth rate and a large
rural labor force that is mostly poor.  In addition, there are large numbers of migrants, refugees,
disabled veterans and demobilized soldiers that must be integrated into the labor market.  The
largely successful economic reforms  have  resulted in  the  retrenchment  of  up  to  1.5 million
workers  from  government  service  and  state  owned  enterprises  (World  Bank  1995b).
Unemployment has increased and real wages have declined by 30 to  50 percent  (ILO  1994).
2Moreover, modem labor practices are new to Vietnam.  In 1995, a labor law was passed and a
labor code was published that  covers  a  wide range of labor issues including labor contracts,
collective bargaining, social insurance, working conditions and training (for a full description, see
World Bank 1995b).
In  1990 the  government began the  process  of dismantling the  old  public sector wage
structure.  No  longer  would  workers  be  paid  mainly according  to  length  of  service,  nor
guaranteed  employment for life.  A plan was announced to  place all government workers  on
contract, but this process has been slow (Hiebert 1993; Norlund 1993).
In 1993 the wages of public servants were partly monetized.  Prior to this only a fraction
of the salaries of civil servants or employees of state-owned enterprises was paid in cash.  Up to
90 percent was received in bonuses and in-kind payments (ILO 1994).  State workers no longer
receive access to rationed goods at artificial prices, nor  do new state employees receive fringe
benefits such as subsidized housing, health services, education and  social insurance.  The new
structure rewards workers according to skill, education, responsibility and job performance.  The
government also announced plans to decompress public sector wages.  The full impact of these
reforms may not be seen for years, however, since those hired prior to 1994 are largely exempted.
Private firms are now free to set wages without government interference.  In the parastatal
sector, subsidies were  reduced in  1989 and further privatization measures introduced  in  1990.
3Still, state owned enterprises continue to  negotiate salary levels for employees with their parent
ministries  rather than with workers  directly  (Lindauer  and  Haughton 1996).
Although  labor mobility  is not officially  restricted,  work permits are legally  required in
most places, and those wishing  to move their place of residence  are supposed  to obtain permits.
These regulations do not,  in practice, prevent many rural inhabitants from 'trying their luck' in
urban labor markets.  In the main cities job seekers queue each morning along central boulevards,
joining what has come to be known as the "labor bazaar" (World Bank  1997).  These informal
labor markets emerged spontaneously in response to uncontrolled rural-urban migration, and they
have given rise to illegal employment services and charges of exploitation.  The Ministry of Labor,
Invalids and Social Affairs estimates the number of rural job  seekers at about 170,000 in Hanoi
and 800,000 in Ho Chi Minh City.
Although government sets an official minimum wage, it is only minimally effective given
the apparent reluctance to enforce this or any other labor regulation when it comes to  domestic
firms.  However, for foreign and joint ventures, the minimum wage almost certainly does have an
effect.  Not  only is it easier to  monitor the relatively small number of  foreign firms, but  the
minimum  wage is set much higher for foreign firms than for local firms. Between 1993 and 1996,
the minimum wage for all enterprises was Vietnamese dong  (VND)  120,000 ($11) per month.
The minimum wage for firms with any degree of foreign ownership was $35 per month in Hanoi
and Ho Chi Minh City, and $30 elsewhere.  A new minimum wage law took  effect in July 1996.
It  raises the minimum wage for foreign firms to  $45 in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi; $40 in
4Haiphong,  Vinh City, Hue, Danang,  Bienhoa, Can Tho, Hatay, Nha Trang and Vung Tau; and
$35 in other places.
BENEFITS  OF SCHOOLING
Returns to investments  in schooling  are estimated  here using  the 1992-93  Vietnam  Living
Standards Survey (VLSS).  The VLSS was carried out jointly by Vietnam's State Planning
Comrnmittee  (now the Ministry  of Planning  and Investment)  and the General Statistics  Office,  from
October 1992  to October 1993,  with funding  from the United  Nations  Development  Programme
and the Swedish  International  Development  Authority. It was the first nationally  representative,
multipurpose  household survey ever done in Vietnam covering a broad range of social and
economic indicators.  Information was collected from about 23,000 people living in 4,800
households  representing  urban  and rural  areas in each of Vietnam's  seven  geographic  regions (for
more details,  see Vietnam  1994). However,  since  many  of the labor  market reforms  did not come
into effect  until later (for example,  salary  reform  did not take place  until 1993),  this analysis  uses
data covering  a period relatively  early  in the reform  process.
Returns to schooling  are estimated  here using a variety of methods.  This is necessary
given  the limited  sample  size of the wage earning  population  in Vietnam. One method  used is the
human  capital  earnings  function  (Mincer  1974):
lnYi  = a +/,S, +  ±rYEi  +  Fr 2 XPi  + Ei  (1)
where Si is the number of years of schooling  of individual  i, and ETP, and EKPj  are years of
experience  and its square. Hours worked per week is added as a compensatory  factor.  In this
5semi-log  specification  the coefficient  on S (,6)  is interpreted  as the average  private  rate of return to
one additional  year of schooling,  regardless  of the level of schooling.
The earnings  function  method  is used to estimate  average  private  returns  to different  levels
of schooling  by converting  the continuous  years of schooling  variable  (S) into a series  of dummy
variables representing the  different levels of schooling.  After fitting the extended earnings
function:
InY,  = a+ 61PRIM,  + /J 2SEC,  +,/3 3VOC + /J 4UNIV,  + yIEX  P, +  2EXP12+  gI  (2)
where PRIM;, SECi, VOC; and  UNIVi are  dummy variables indicating primary, secondary
academic,  secondary  vocational  and university  education  completion  by individual  i, the private
rates of return to different  levels  of schooling  are then  calculated  as follows:
r(PRJM)  =  8, ISPRM  (3)
r(SEC) =  (/32  - fJ)/(SSEC-  SPPL)  (4)
r(Voc)  =  (133-  fI)/(SVOC-  SPR)  (5)
r(UI;V)  =  (/34  - ,82)/(SUIV-  SSEC)  (6)
where  SpRuy=6,  SSEC=7,  Svoc= 6 and  Suav=4,  the average  number  of years  of schooling  for the four
levels of education. However, it is incorrect to assume that primary school graduates forego
earnings  for the entire  duration  of their studies. Therefore,  only one year  of foregone  earnings  are
assumed for primary school graduates, for example, SPR1.
6A more complete method is the net earnings profile method, where detailed age-earnings
profiles by level of education are used and the rate of return is computed as the discount rate that
equates the stream of education benefits to the stream of educational costs is computed:
n  n
IB/  (l  ±r) t = IC/(±  +r)t (7)
t=O  t=0
where Bt and C, are the average benefits and costs of the particular educational investment (for
example, completing secondary education following completion of primary education) in year t, n
is the expected life of the investment, and r is the rate of return.
The benefit of an educational investment is measured as the average additional earnings
received by (for example) the graduates  of secondary school, over  and above the graduates  of
primary school.  The cost of the investment comprises direct and indirect costs.  The direct costs
for the individual include all expenditures related to  school attendance, and for society, the full
resource costs of providing the educational service, including any subsidized costs not borne by
the individual or the individual's family. The indirect costs are the average earnings foregone as a
result of the investment.
This method, while straightforward and requiring fewer "as if'  assumptions than other,
more  elegant  methods  used  to  estimate  rates  of  return  to  educational  investments,  is  data
demanding.  One must have sufficient numbers of observations in all age-education level cells to
be able to construct well-behaved age-earnings profiles (that is, profiles that are noncrossing and
concave to the horizontal axis).
7In the absence of good outcome data (and this is usually the case in a transition economy
where wages may not well reflect productivity differences), much can still be said with cost data
alone. For example, in considering the benefits of education, "switching values" are very useful in
the  absence of reliable data  on earnings differentials.  The analysis, sometimes referred to  as
"reverse  cost-benefit  analysis," consists  of  estimating the  productivity  differential required  in
order for an education investment to be acceptable in terms of its rate of return.  The question is
framed  in  the following manner:  given the  cost  of  producing  a  graduate,  what  productivity
differential would be  required for the  investment to  exhibit a  10 percent  social rate of return
(assuming  10 percent  to  be  the social opportunity cost  of capital)?  The reverse cost-benefit
method can be shown as:
Dt)s-  l=  O.  10[ ts(Cs+ Ws-l)]  (8)
where DS/S-l  is the required productivity differential between a person who has graduated  from
schooling level S and one who has graduated from level S-1; ts is the number of years required to
complete level S (seven years, say, for secondary education, assuming no grade repetition); Cs is
the per  student direct  resource  cost  of each year of the investment and Ws-, is the  earnings
foregone during each year of the investment.  This method provides guidance on investment in
education in the absence of reliable earnings information.  It is up to the policymaker to  decide
whether the estimated required differential is likely to be realized.
8EMPLOYMENT  AND EARNINGS  DIFFERENTIALS
Vietnam is predominantly a rural country, and most Vietnamese make their living off the
land.  Two-thirds of all workers are in agriculture. Other large sectors include manufacturing (12
percent)  and wholesale and retail trade-including  restaurants  and hotels (11 percent)  (World
Bank 1997).
Most workers in Vietnam (79 percent) are self-employed, and 11 percent are employed in
private firms.  The public sector, broadly speaking, accounts  for 9 percent  of the labor force
(World Bank  1996).  Estimates here of the returns  to  schooling are limited to  the wage labor
force, thus excluding the large self-employed sector for which the VLSS does not collect earnings
information.  The fact that  this  analysis relates  only to  20  percent  of the  labor  force must,
therefore, be kept in mind.
The Vietnamese wage labor force is relatively well educated, especially for a low-income
country (Table 1).  The mean age of the sample is 31 years.  The average number of school years
completed is 7.9, years of experience 17 and hours worked per week 46.  About a quarter (22
percent) of the sample have no education or incomplete primary, and half have completed just the
primary cycle.  Only 8 and 12 percent of the labor force have secondary academic and secondary
vocational education, and 7 percent have completed university.  Over 40 percent of those in the
wage labor force are employed in the public sector broadly speaking (which includes government,
state companies, cooperatives and social organizations).  Mean monthly earnings are about VND
152,000 ($14).
9Table 1: Vietnam: Means of Selected Variables by Sex and Sector of E  loyment
All  Public  Private
Variable  Total  Males  Females  Total  Males  Females  Total  Males  Females
Age (years)  30.8  31.2  30.2  34.1  35.7  32.2  28.4  28.5  28.2
Years of schooling  7.9  7.9  7.8  10.5  10.5  10.4  6.0  6.3  5.4
Years of experience  17.0  17.4  16.4  17.7  19.2  15.8  16.4  16.2  16.9
Education level (0,1) *
No education  0.22  0.21  0.24  0.06  0.06  0.07  0.34  0.31  0.40
Primary  0.50  0.53  0.44  0.39  0.43  0.35  0.57  0.59  0.53
Secondary  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.12  0.11  0.12  0.06  0.07  0.04
Vocational  0.12  0.10  0.16  0.26  0.22  0.31  0.03  0.03  0.03
University  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.17  0.19  0.15  0.01  0.01  0.00
Earnings/month  152  170  124  167  188  143  140  159  107
('OOOs  VND)
Public sector  0.42  0.38  0.48  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Hours-worked/week  46.2  46.8  45.5  43.5  43.2  43.8  48.2  48.9  47.0
N  2,259  1,355  904  950  516  434  1,309  839  470
Source:  VLSS 1992-93
*  Highest  level  attained
Males are about one year older than females and their earnings nearly 40 percent higher
(VND  170,000  vs.  VND  124,000).  Men  and  women  have  nearly  the  same  educational
attainment. Private sector workers are much younger than public sector workers and work nearly
five hours more per week.  Educational attainment in the private sector is much lower than in the
public sector (more than four year's  difference). In the public sector, even small state enterprises
employ workers with at least ten years of schooling (Ronnas and Sjoberg 1995).  This is a result
of the past policy of government's allocating labor with more than primary schooling.  Graduates
of secondary and tertiary education, including higher-level vocational graduates, were  assigned
jobs  in  the  public sector.  Only primary school  graduates  and  those  without  any  education
operated in a labor market of sorts.  A reliance on market signals to allocate educated labor was
announced, however, as Government policy at the 1991 Party Congress.  Few primary school
10graduates work in the public sector.  Vocational school graduates work almost exclusively in the
public sector.  Overall earnings are much higher in the public sector.
Economic restructuring policies, which began in the mid-1980s in Vietnam, accord a lead
role  to  the  private  sector  in  the  transition  to  a  market  economy  and  in  overall  economic
development.  Employment growth is highest in the private sector, which needs to absorb not only
new labor market entrants but also the labor shed by state enterprises.  During 1989-1993, about
4.7 million new jobs were created in the private sector.  Given a reduction of about 900,000 jobs
in the state sector, the net increase was 3.8 million additional jobs (World Bank 1995b).  Private
sector workers are paid less than those are in the public sector.  In the public sector, workers with
little or no education have relatively high earnings (Table 2).  Remuneration rates in the public
sector are compressed, resulting in apparent overpayment of workers with less than a primary
education.
Table 2: Vietnam: Monthly Earnings by Economic Sector (VND per month)
Educational level*  Public  Private
No education  187,514  117,641
(59)  (446)
Primary  154,690  146,558
(375)  (747)
Secondary  157,871  182,930
(111)  (75)
Vocational  146,891  187,137
(246)  (34)
University  227,452  247,837
(159)  (7)
Overall  167,259  140,385
(950)  (1,309)
Source:  VLSS 1992-93
Note: Numbers  in parentheses
* Highest  level  attained
11ESTIMATES  OF THE RETURNS  TO SCHOOLING
The  reverse  cost-benefit  method  (switching  analysis) suggests  that  education  was  a
marginal investment in Vietnam in the early 1990s.  Actual earnings differentials are presented in
Table 3.  These show the absolute amount in VND, by which holders of a particular degree or
level of schooling surpass the earnings of those  with the next lowest level of schooling.  For
example, primary  school  leavers  earn VND  276,000  more per  year than  do  those  with  no
education.  The next column presents the amount in VND by which primary school leavers would
need to surpass on average the earnings of those with no education in order for the investment to
realize a 10 percent social rate of return.  Thus, primary school leavers already earn on average
more than what is needed to realize a 10 percent social rate of return.  However, because of the
level of costs, required earnings differentials at higher schooling levels are very high, especially for
vocational education.
12Table 3: Reverse Cost-Benefit Analysis: Earnings Differentials  Required to Realize 10 Percent
Rate of Return
Variables in Equation (8)
(Cs)  (Ws)  (ts)  (Ds)  (Ws -Ws-,)  Observed as
Education level  Cost per  Average  Assumed  Required  Observed  percent of
(and investment  student  earnings  cost  differential  differential  required
reference level)  year  (VND'OOO)  periods  (VND'OOO)  (VND'OOO)  (VND'000)
(VND'000)  (years)
None  ...  ...  ...
1,512
Primary
(vs none)  192  1,788  Cs:  5  247  276  112%
Ws: 1
Secondary
(vs primary)  436  2,016  7  1,557  228  15%
VOTECH
(vs primary)  1,331  1,824  5  1,560  36  2%
Tertiary
(vs secondary)  2,745  2,736  4  1,904  912  48%
Source: VLSS 1992-93.
The results  of estimating a  simple earnings function show education to  be  a  marginal
investment (Table 4).  Overall, the average private rate of return on another year of schooling is 5
percent.  This  is very  different from the  previous  and  dated  analysis limited to  rural  South
Vietnam (Stroup  and Hargrove  1969).  An additional year of schooling at that time in  South
Vietnam led to an increase in earnings of 16.8 percent in 1964.
13Table 4: Vietnam: Earnings Functions
(dependent variable is the natural log of monthly earnings)
Variable  All  Males  Females
Constant  0.775  1.045  0.583
Years of schooling  0.048  0.034  0.068
(8.4)  (4.5)  (7.6)
Years of experience  0.064  .0.059  0.065
(10.1)  (6.9)  (6.8)
Experience-squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001
(8.3)  (5.6)  (5.5)
Log hours-worked  0.726  0.722  0.697
(11.7)  (9.  1)  (7.1)
R-squared  0.112  0.095  0.137
N  2,259  1,355  904
Source:  VLSS 1992-93
Note:  t-statistics  in parentheses
When earnings functions are  estimated separately, males  experience lower  returns  to
schooling than do females.  This is similar to the pattern found in China in the mid 1980s (Jamison
and van der Gaag  1987).  In Vietnam, males receive a 3 percent increase in earnings for every
year of schooling; females experience a 7 percent increase.
The estimates for Vietnam are low compared with the returns to education estimated for
other developing countries.  Worldwide, another year of schooling increases earnings by about 10
percent (Psacharopoulos 1994). But estimated returns to schooling are low in general in centrally
planned and transition economies. For example, in China the estimates of the returns to schooling
ranged from  1 to  5 percent in  the mid  1980s (Jamison and van  der  Gaag  1987; Byron  and
Manolato 1990; Meng 1995), and 3 percent in 1989 (Xie and Hannum 1996).  Gregory and Meng
(1995), in a  very useful analysis of rural industrial data,  disaggregated their  sample into two
groups: those who were allocated their jobs and those who found them on their own.  Returns to
14schooling for those  allocated their jobs  are small and not  statistically significant.  But for those
who found employment on their own, the returns  are large and significant.  Xie and Hannum
(1996) find that membership in the communist party in China accounts for a high proportion of
earnings and argue that this is a form of human capital in that workers use membership to  gain
access to jobs allowing them to make use of their skills. Since in Vietnam the majority of workers
with secondary, vocational or university education were assigned to jobs in the public sector an
average rate of return of 5 percent to  one additional year of schooling is entirely consistent with
these findings for China.
Low rates of return to  schooling are found in other command economies: Hungary, 4.3
percent  in  1987, and Poland, 2.9  percent in  1986 (Psacharopoulos  1994).  Scarce, over-time
evidence, however,  seems to  be showing that  successful reform will eventually lead to  higher
returns.  An empirical analysis of changes in the wage structure in  Slovenia between  1987 and
1991 reveals that the returns to human capital rise dramatically during transition.  Workers with
four years of university education gained the most in relative earnings, followed by those with two
years of university.  The education group that gained the least, however,  relative to  the  least
educated, were holders of vocational degrees (Orazem and Vodopivec 1995).  In Hungary, the
private rate of return almost doubled in secondary education between 1971 and  1993, and there
was a three-and-a-half-fold increase in the returns to higher education (Varga 1995).
Workers in the public sector in Vietnam realize higher private rates of return to  schooling
than do private sector workers (Table 5).  This may not, however,  signal that  productivity is
15better rewarded in the public sector.  It may simply  be a relic of the past policy of  allocating
educated labor to public  sector positions. Most of the workers in the private sector have primary
education or  less, while public sector workers usually have at  least a  primary education.
However, the fact that in the public  sector workers with no or very little education  earned  more,
on average,  than primary,  secondary  or vocational  school  graduates  (Table  2) suggests  that there
are significant  distortions in public sector pay.  It is likely that factors other than education
(perhaps,  as in China,  membership  in the Communist  Party) had an impact  on public  sector pay in
Vietnam,  as in other command  economies.
Table  5: Vietnam:  Earnings  Functions  by Sector of Employment  (both sexes)
Sector  of Employment
Public  Private
Constant  0.265  1.168
Years of schooling  0.062  0.039
(6.3)  (4.0)
Years of experience  0.046  0.072
(4.4)  (8.4)
Experience-squared  -0.001  -0.001
(3.3)  (7.3)
Log hours-worked  0.878  0.617
(10.5)  (6.7)
R-squared  0.145  0.085
N  950  1,309
Source:  VLSS  1992-93
Note:  t-statistics  in parentheses
The earnings function  is fitted using dummy  variables  for those who have completed a
particular level of education (Table 6).  The results are reasonable,  except that for males the
coefficient  on primary  education  is not significant.  Also it would  appear that those with less than
a complete  primary education earn higher wages in the public sector than do workers with a
16complete primary education.  The results from the earnings functions can be used to estimate the
earnings premium associated with each level of education and the private rate of return to  each
level of schooling.
Table 6: Vietnam: Earnings Functions with Schooling Levels
Variables  All  Males  Females  Public  Privatea
Constant  0.870  1.181  0.617  0.845  1.220
Primary  0.134  0.035  0.214  -0.278  0.233
(2.2)  (0.5)  (2.3)  (2.0)  (3.2)
Secondary  0.325  0.269  0.423  0.404  0.260
(3.8)  (2.4)  (3.1)  (3.7)  (1.9)
Vocational  0.207  0.240  0.259  0.276  ---
(2.8)  (2.3)  (2.4)  (3.4)
University  0.437  0.414  0.488  0.429  ---
(3.8)  (2.8)  (2.7)  (3.5)
Experience  0.064  0.057  0.066  0.053  0.072
(9.9)  (6.6)  (6.7)  (5.1)  (8.3)
Experience-squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001
(8.4)  (5.5)  (5.8)  (4.2)  (7.3)
Log hours-worked  0.750  0.732  0.751  0.888  0.618
(12.1)  (9.3)  (7.5)  (10.8)  (6.8)
R-squared  0.124  0.111  0.142  0.179  0.087
N  2,259  1,355  904  950  1,309
Source:  VLSS 1992-93
Note:  t-statistics in parentheses;  all variables  are significant  at the 10% level or better, except where
indicated  by *; the omitted  category  for level  of education  is no education
a Vocational  and university  coefficients  not shown  because  of an insufficient  number  of observations
Large earnings premiums translate into relatively high private returns to  schooling (Table
7).  Overall university is a good private investment. For females primary and university education
are profitable investments.  In the public sector, university is a good  investment, while primary
education is not.  The highest private  rate of return  is at the  primary level for  private  sector
workers.  Secondary  academic  and  secondary  vocational  education  are  consistently  poor
investments.
17Table 7: Vietnam: Private Rates of Return to Schooling by Level of Education (percent)
Educational level  All  Males  Females  Public  Private
Primary (vs less than primary)  13  21  23
Secondary (vs primary)  5  4  6  6  4
Vocational (vs primary)  4  5  5  6
University (vs secondary)  11  10  12  11
Source:  Based on the earnings  functions  results presented  in Table 6
REGIONAL  DIFFERENCES
Evidence of low returns  to  schooling in Vietnam is not  surprising.  Analysis of private
enterprises (Ronnas 1992) revealed a negative correlation between education and earnings.  This
is attributed to large regional differences in general levels of education and income.  The level of
education in the North is higher than in the South, and wage levels in the South are much higher
than in the North.  Ronnas argues that the income differences are due to  the generally higher
capital-labor ratio  and better  endowment with machinery and equipment in the  South.  Other
factors may also be at work such as differences in work discipline, infrastructure and transaction
costs.
The VLSS confirms that schooling levels are higher in the North.  On average workers in
the North have about ten years of schooling, while in the South the average worker has less than
seven years of schooling (Figure  1).  In terms of earnings, however, workers in the South earn
more  than  workers  in  the  North:  VND 182,495  ($17)  versus  VND94,174  ($9)  per  month.
Therefore,  workers  in the  South  have a third  less schooling but  earn  50 percent  more  than
workers in the North.
18Figure 1: Vietnam: Schooling and Earnings Differences by Region






North  South  North  South
Source:  VLSS 1992-93
Estimating earnings functions separately for workers in the North and the South results in
rates of return to schooling that are similar in both regions (Table 8).  On average, an additional
year of schooling will increase earnings by 8 percent in both regions.  Experience, however, is
rewarded more in the South than in the North.  Also, hours worked have a slightly higher payoff
in the South.
Table 8: Vietnam: Earnings Functions by Region
Variable  North  South
Constant  0.515  0.782
Years of schooling  0.082  0.078
(6.8)  (12.0)
Years of experience  0.041  0.078
(4.1)  (10.2)
Experience-squared  -0.001  -0.001
(3.0)  (8.5)
Log hours worked/week  0.639  0.698
(6.7)  (9.4)
R-squared  0.113  0.177
N  788  1,471
Source:  VLSS  1992-93
19RECENT  COHORTS
A cross-sectional sample may not be very instructive in a rapidly changing economy.  For
this reason the sample is divided into two groups: recent labor market entrants and workers with
more than six years experience.  Focusing on recent graduates allows one to reflect the fact that
reforms may not have affected all workers by 1993.  Younger workers are expected to be more
affected by the recent changes as they enter directly into a free market wage economy.  In fact,
those with less years of labor market experience receive higher returns to  schooling: 14 percent
versus 4 percent for more experienced workers (Table 9).  In China, too, the returns to schooling
for younger workers are higher than for more experienced workers, showing that in both Vietnam
and China the returns to schooling increase as newer cohorts enter the labor market (World Bank
1996).
Table 9: Vietnam: Earnings Functions for Recent Labor Market Entrants and
Experienced Workers
Variable  Recent Entrants  Experienced Workers
(less than 6 years)  (more than 5 years)
Constant  0.217  0.792
Years of schooling  0.144  0.044
(5.9)  (7.5)
Years of experience  0.204*  0.055
(1.3)  (6.5)
Experience-squared  0.006*  -0.001
(0.2)  (5.9)
Log hours-worked  0.489  0.759
(2.6)  (11.7)
R-squared  0.138  0.103
N  328  1,931
Source:  VLSS 1992-93
Note:  t-statistics  appear  in parentheses;  all variables  are significant  at the 10%  level
or better, except  where  indicated  by *
20AGE-EARNINGS  PROFILES
The private rate of return to schooling  is also estimated  using the complete  or discounted
earnings  profile method. The age-earnings  profiles  estimated  from the VLSS are not very well
behaved,  a problem attributable  to the small  numbers  in the VLSS data set.  But after removing
outliers and smoothing  out the data, estimation  of the private  rate of return to schooling  results  in
high estimates  at the primary  level  and low estimates  at the secondary  and university  levels  (Table
10). In terms of pricing  policy,  were primary  education  free at the primary  level,  at least in terms
of direct monetary  costs, then the returns to primary  schooling  would be very high. However,
parents do face direct monetary charges  for their children's enrollment  in primary school. The
VLSS collects this information  and it is used here to  estimate the private rate of return to
schooling.
When  the full private  direct cost of schooling  is added to the calculations,  the private rate
of return to primary  schooling  decreases  by 27 percent. Addition  of the private  costs reduces  the
returns by 18 and 20 percent for secondary  and university  graduates.  This reflects the fact that
higher  levels  of education  are relatively  more highly  subsidized  than primary  education-an  aspect
of pricing  policy  in Vietnam  that benefits  the better off at the expense  of the poor, and therefore
raises serious  issues of equity. Nevertheless,  primary  education  remains  a profitable  investment
on average.  But since the poor are likely  to have more children,  then the costs of schooling
become  a significant  burden. Secondary  education  does not appear  to be a very good investment,
but the analysis  masks  one of the key benefits  that individuals  derive  from secondary  schooling-
21it allows one to pursue studies at higher schooling levels.  This is known as the "option value" of
secondary schooling (World Bank 1991; Weisbrod 1964).
Table 10: Vietnam: Rate of Return using Complete Method, 1992-93
Educational Level  Private  Private  Social
(no cost)  (private costs included)  (all costs included)
Primary (vs no education)  18.5  13.5  10.8
Secondary (vs primary)  5.5  4.5  3.8
University (vs secondary)  7.8  6.2  3.0
Source: VLSS 1992-93,  using rate of return  program  (Psacharopoulos  1996)
Social rates of return are highest for primary education.  In fact, the earnings data used in
these calculations suggest that  only primary schooling was  a worthwhile social investment in
Vietnam in the early 1990s.  University education had a low  social rate  of return, but  recent
evidence from a survey of higher education graduates indicates that earnings for graduates may
have increased in recent years.  The difference between the social and private returns suggests an
over-subsidization of higher education.  However, tuition fees were introduced at the university
level in 1993, and the government plans to increase cost recovery in higher education, so this gap
may be reduced in the future.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The returns to  schooling in Vietnam are low by international standards.  The estimates
come from earnings data for  1992-93.  These are the best data currently available, but may be
distorted for a number of reasons.  First, public sector pay reflects the past  policy of assigning
secondary and higher education graduates to the public sector.  Also, we have limited the analysis
22to wage earners, while over 80 per cent of the Vietnamese  labor force are self-employed  and
many have multiple  jobs.  The estimates  of social rates of return, as in most studies,  do not take
into account externalities,  and should therefore  be treated as under estimates  of the true social
impact  of education.
There are signs,  however,  that the returns will increase  as Vietnam's market reforms  take
hold.  The high rates of return observed  for younger  cohorts are one sign. The evidence  of other
former  command  economies  that have completed  the transition  to strong market institutions  also
point  to higher  education  returns in Vietnam's  future.
This study has implications  for the financing  of education  in Vietnam,  even though it is
based on admittedly  poor data.  Primary  education,  the most profitable  sub-sector  judging from
the estimated  social  rate-of-return  results, is much less subsidized  than higher levels. In fact, the
high subsidy  levels  for higher and, especially,  vocational  education  contributes  to the low rates of
return for these sub-sectors. Family  contributions  to direct cost financing  at the primary  level are
a heavy burden, especially  for the  poor, and this is neither socially optimal nor equitable.
Vietnam's  policy  makers  may  consider  direct  subsidization  of poor primary  school  age children  to
ensure that they enroll in school and remain enrolled.  A policy of increased  cost recovery in
higher education  has already  been  introduced.
There is scope for reform in terms of remuneration  policy and recruitment  policy  in the
public sector.  Most university  graduates are still recruited into the civil service, artificially
23propping  up the returns to public  higher education. Evidence  from the recently  completed  Higher
Education  Graduate  Tracer Study (World  Bank 1997) suggests  that change  is occurring  rapidly.
For example,  more and more university  graduates are taking positions in the private sector, in
contrast  to the situation  just three to four  years  ago, when hardly  any  graduates  did so.
It is important  to monitor future earnings  and labor market trends.  In fact it would be
desirable to update these estimates  as soon as more recent earnings data are available. The
Higher  Education  Graduate  Tracer Study  conducted  in 1996-97  suggests  that the labor market is
changing  rapidly.  Future updates of this analysis,  based on more recent data, could not only
provide  more robust estimates,  but also provide  evidence  on whether  the impact  of labor market
reforms is increasing  over time, as suggested in this paper.  The Vietnamese  Government  is
currently  reassessing  pricing  policy. It has already  begun to increase  cost recovery at the higher
education  level. Tuition  fees were introduced  in 1993 and the current policy  is to increase  cost
recovery,  which is likely  to reduce the gap between social and private rates of return.  If costs
could be reduced-for  example by better utilization  of teachers and by reducing unit costs in
higher education  through  encouraging  mergers  to achieve  economies  of scale-this  could reduce
costs and therefore  increase  the rate of return.
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